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A SUBMISSION TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN RELATION TO THE ISSUES PAPER RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
TRADE MARKS - FEBRUARY 2002. 
 
 
Issues Paper Reference 
 
Under  the heading “Non-word or logo marks (eg: sounds, colours, shapes, etc  (4.2.1.b of the 
Issues Paper), the general comment is made that the “new types” of signs highlighted in 
the Trade Marks Act 1995 are being subjected to a preliminary assessment as to whether 
they can even be trade marks, before undergoing the ‘capable of distinguishing’ test. 
 
Issue 
 
With respect to “shape” marks, there would appear to be a “break”, imposed by the 
Australian Courts, in the logical conclusion that registration of a shape, which performs 
a functional purpose, or even further, is indistinguishable from the shape of the item or 
product, creates a perpetual monopoly in the manufacture of that product. 
 
The Act  
 
As we know, the registration of a shape mark is accommodated by the introduction in 
the 1995 Trade Marks Act  of an expanded definition of ‘trade mark’. A ‘trade mark’ is 
defined to mean: 
“…a sign used or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in 
the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any 
other person.”1 
Further, a ‘sign’ is defined to include: 
                                                          
1 s.17 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 
“the following or any combination of the following, namely, any letter word, name, signature, 
numeral, device, brand heading, label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound 
or scent.” 2 (emphasis added) 
 
The often utilised infringement provision provides: 
“A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is 
substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to the 
goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.”3 
It appears that there have been only two Australian cases since the enactment of the 
Trade Marks Act 1995 which have concerned the infringement of a ‘shape’ mark: The 
Coca-Cola case 4 and the Philips case 5.  
A careful analysis of these cases is warranted, not only because the application of s. 120 
to ‘shape’ marks is ‘conceptually difficult’6, but because I believe that understanding the 
interpretation by the courts of the provisions relating to shape marks, is necessary in 
order to determine the validity of these marks.  
 
The decisions address two fundamental issues in particular: 
 the distinction of the ‘mark’ in question from the goods themselves; 
                                                          
2 s.6 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. 
3 s. 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995.   
4 Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (t/a Millers Distributing Co) (1998) 43 IPR 47 (18 December 
1998), and on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court reported at (1999) 47 IPR 481 (10 
December 1999).  
5 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Limited  [1999] FCA 816 (18 
June 1999) and on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court [2000] FCA 876 (30 June 2000) and 
on application for special leave to the High Court S175/2000 (6 April 2001). 
6 ‘Patents, Trade Marks & Related Rights’ Lahore, Butterworths, at [56,247]. 
 whether a permanent monopoly for a product can be obtained by the registration as 
a shape mark of a representation of one of its functional features.  
Coca-Cola case 
 
Coca-Cola had within its marks portfolio in Australia a registered mark for “the contour bottle mark”, 
which was a two dimensional drawing of a distinctive bottle in which Coca-Cola has been 
traditionally sold. 
 
The respondent distributed ‘cola bottle confectionary,’ which was a cola flavoured gelatine confectionary 
with a slightly distorted shape of a Coca-Cola bottle with the word ‘COLA’ inscribed on it. 
 
 At first instance Merkel J found that the shape mark was not infringed. His Honour recalled the 
precedent that  “the word ‘mark’ …..is apt only to describe something which distinguishes goods 
rather than goods themselves……The distinction between a mark and a thing which is marked is 
supported by authority.”7 
 
Although Merkel J found authority to support the proposition that the mark must be depicted and 
described as something apart from the goods, he warned the precedents did not involve the 1995 
Act.  His Honour found that the distinction was less obvious after the 1995 Act. At page 62 he 
states: 
                                                          
7 Re Coca-Cola Trade Marks (1986) 6 IPR 275. 
“It can generally be accepted that the application or use of the shape of the contour 
bottle as a trade mark is to be distinguished from a product having the shape of 
the bottle which, as such, is not applied or used as a trade mark. Although Re 
Coca-Cola Trade Marks makes that point, the issue arising in the present case in 
respect of infringement relates to whether the alleged infringing product 
involves use of a mark as a trade mark (ie a badge of origin), as well as, as a 
product. If it does, then I see no reason why a three dimensional product cannot 
involve use of a mark which is deceptively similar to, and thereby infringe, a two 
dimensional mark. With devices (to which I have referred) and products in the 
shape of the devices becoming more common as badges of origin, the two 
dimensional/three dimensional distinction sought to be drawn by the 
respondent, whilst helpful as a distinction in some cases, is not a valid basis for 
concluding that a three dimensional product cannot result in infringement of a 
two dimensional mark.”  
Although conceptually satisfied that there could be infringement, Merkel J found there 
was no infringement as the cola bottle confectionary, as such, did not indicate or connote 
origin of the goods.  
The full court reversed this decision. The court said that the appropriate test was 
whether the ‘sign’ used indicated origin of the goods in the user of the sign. The full 
court asked whether the respondent had used the shape of the confectionary to indicate 
its origin and considered the features of the coke bottle were used by the confectionary 
as a mark. 
 
The full court stressed that this difficult issue need only arise in cases where the mark 
was undistinguishable from the product. 
 
The Philips case was such a case. 
 
Philips Case 
 
Philips owned two registered trade marks, registered under the Trade Marks 
 
Act 1955 registered in class 8 for shaving apparatus. These were respectively two and 
three dimensional representations of the shaving surface of the triple headed shaver. 
Philips also had applied for registration in class 8 under the Trade Marks Act 1995 as a 
shape of  “a shaving unit consisting of a substantially equilateral triangularly shaped housing 
containing three circular shaving heads.”  
 
Philips was the only triple headed rotary shavers in Australia between 1956 and 1997. In 
June 1997, Remington imported and sold a triple head rotary shaver.  Philips sought 
orders including permanent injunctions and declarations that Remington infringed their 
trade marks. Remington cross-claimed seeking a declaration that the subject of the 
application for a shape mark was not registrable.  
 
At first instance before Lehane J, determined that the Philips trade marks were not 
considered to be infringed. On appeal to the full court of the Federal Court the trial 
judge’s decision was upheld unanimously. 
 
Lehane J determined that a mark registered as a ‘shape’ under the 1995 Act could be 
infringed by the shape of three-dimensional product provided the product's shape was 
used as a trade mark. 
 
Philips failed before Lehane J because it failed to show that Remington was using the 
shape of the triple-head as a trade mark. Rather, he decided that Remington had only 
emphasised the triple head to identify what sort of a shaver it was, but did not use the 
shape as a trade mark. This was a defensible use under s. 122(1)(b) of the Act as a use in 
good faith to indicate quality and kind of the goods.8 
 
It is helpful for the purpose of this comment to note that Lehane J undertook an 
examination of the history of the insertion of ‘shape’ in the definition set out earlier.  
 
It is understood that the 1995 Act not only was a result of the Minister’s directive to 
streamline this area of law but also was prompted by Australian obligations under 
general international agreement of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights 
(TRIPS). Noteworthy, the Trade Marks Act 1994 was enacted but did not come into effect 
until submissions were received, resulting in the repeal of the 1994 Act and the 
enactment of the 1995 Act. 
 
Relevant to the issue here, the 1994 Act provided: 
‘"39 An application for the registration of a trade mark in respect of goods must be 
rejected if the trade mark consists wholly or principally of:  
                                                          
8 Lahore at [56,251] 
(a) the shape, or some other characteristic, possessed, because of their nature, by the 
goods; or  
(b) a shape, or some other characteristic, that the goods must have if a particular technical 
result is to be obtained." 
 
The 1995 Act  contains no such provision: it deals with the problem in a rather different 
way, particularly, perhaps, in s 41(6): 
"(6) If the Registrar finds that the trade mark is not inherently adapted to distinguish the 
designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons, the following 
provisions apply:  
(a) if the applicant establishes that, because the extent to which the applicant has used the 
trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application, it does distinguish the 
designated goods or services as being those of the applicant - the trade mark is taken to be 
capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of 
other persons;  
(b) in any other case - the trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the 
designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons." ‘9 
 
After considering the Explanatory Memorandum for the Act, the second reading speech 
and the Ministerial comments on release, Lehane J concluded: 
“One clear impression left by that history is that it was not thought that the inclusion of 
"shape" in the definition of "sign" would effect a radical change in trade mark law.”10 
 
The relevance of this perspective will become clear in the interpretations considered below by the Full 
Federal Court and the High Court. 
 
Like the trial judge, the full court determined that Remington’s marketing emphasis was 
on the shape as a quality of the product not as to trade origin. It is noteworthy, that no 
consumer evidence was called by Philips with regard to whether the shaving head 
indicated in Remington the shaver’s origin. 
                                                          
9 Lehane J judgement at paragraphs 21 and 21. 
10 Lehane J judgement at paragraph 26. 
 
 The following extracts from the decision of Burchett J of the full court are illuminative. 
Speaking on whether the 1995 Act introduced a radical change to trade mark law by 
introducing shape marks which were also functional, his Honour said at [15] of the 
reasons:  
 
“The trial judge discussed (at 558-560) the question whether the 1995 Act has changed 
all that. It is unnecessary to repeat the various conflicting indications of legislative 
intention detailed in that discussion. I think it is important to note, as his Honour does at 
560, that the legislative background leaves a clear impression the inclusion of the word 
"shape" in the definition of "sign" was not understood to involve the effecting of a 
radical change in trade mark law. It seems to me that this is the reason there is so little 
assistance to be gained from ministerial statements or explanations. The amendment was 
simply not seen as important. Nor was the deletion of the provision made by s 39 of the 
repealed Trade Marks Act 1994. No change being contemplated to the nature of 
trade mark use, it followed that neither a shape "possessed, because of their 
nature, by the goods" nor a shape "that the goods must have if a particular 
technical result is to be obtained" (the categories of shape identified in s.39) 
could distinguish the goods of one trade source from the similar goods of another; 
and therefore such a shape could not function as a trade mark. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine how such a shape of the goods themselves could be …….nothing other than part 
of the use of the commodity itself. Section 39 was omitted from the Trade Marks Act  
1995 because it was unnecessary. “(emphasis added) 
 
 
 
Understandably, one asks: “Well, how can a shape mark which has a role in the 
technical result be registered?’ 
 
His Honour Burchett J, believed it could:11 
 
“It does not follow that a shape can never be registered as a trade mark if it is the shape of the 
whole or a part of the relevant goods, so long as the goods remain distinct from the mark. 
Some special shape of a container for a liquid may, subject to the matters already discussed, be 
used as a trade mark, just as the shape of a medallion attached to goods might be so used. A 
shape may be applied, as has been said, in relation to goods, perhaps by moulding or 
impressing, so that it becomes a feature of their shape, though it may be irrelevant to their 
function.  
 
                                                          
11 At [16] 
The full court’s position, and the current law in Australia from this decision, can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. A shape, which is a functional part of the inherent form of goods, is necessarily a 
shape which other traders might legitimately wish to use; 
2. it follows that such a shape cannot distinguish the goods of one trader ; 
3. that because the fundamental purpose of a trade mark is to distinguish the 
products of one trader from those of another, such a shape cannot be regarded as 
within the definition of a trade mark. 
 
The court in Philips distinguished the Coca-Cola case by saying that in that case the shape 
was moulded onto the confectionary. The court went on to say that the mark may be 
stamped into the product or moulded on it such as in the case of a liquid which may be 
sold in a container so formed as to constitute at once both container and mark.  
 
But, the court said, in none of these cases was the mark devoid of a separate identity  
 
from that of the goods. 12 
 
The end result, in my opinion, is that the full court has inserted a “break” in the logical conclusion that a 
registered shape which is inextricably linked to its function may amount to a perpetual monopoly 
to make the product. 
 
Why is this so? I believe the answer is hinted in the opening line of the full court reasons: 
                                                          
12 at [12]. 
“A fundamental issue of trade mark law is involved in this appeal. Under the new Trade 
Marks Act 1995 (Cth), can a permanent monopoly for a product be obtained by the 
registration as a mark of a representation of one of its vital features? “ 
 
In the application by Philips for leave to appeal to the High Court, Queens Counsel 
appearing for Philips, submitted that the full court was imposing questions of the 
validity of the trade mark instead of questions of infringement. This however did not 
sway the High Court, as they noted with interest that in other countries where the 
Philips v Remington litigation had been dealt with, Remington had successfully 
challenged the registration of the shape in answer to the infringement proceedings.  
 
The High Court seems to have been concerned that granting special leave would be a 
waste of time if ultimately the registration would be expunged, along the lines the full 
court had indicated. 13 
 
It was argued by Philips, that the working party had felt that there should be a ‘break’ by 
reference to functionality, and as the break (s.39 of the 1994 Act), was not inserted into 
the 1995 Act, it was important to impute a ‘break’ was not intended. 
To this his Honour Kirby J responded: 
“It may not be such a bad social consequence that the Full Federal Court has inserted a 
break, if it is viable and consistent with the language of the legislation.”14 
                                                          
13 Note although there was a cross-claim by Remington in relation to the application for a shape 
mark under the 1995 Act, his Honour did not adjudicate on the issue because to do so would take 
the matter out of the hands of the Registrar whose valuable comments would otherwise not be 
available to the court. 
14 High Court transcript of proceedings 6 April 2001 at page 5. 
It was submitted for Remington that nowhere in the world had it been held that by registration of a trade 
mark for a shape one was able to get a perpetual monopoly for the manufacture of the product of 
that shape. 
 
On the issue of whether the 1995 Act introduced a radical change to trade mark law his Honour said: 
“But there is a point is there not, in the proposition that had it been intended to pick up such a 
large consequence, one would have expected perhaps a clearer provision in the TRIPS 
agreement, a clearer provision in the legislation and at least a sentence from the Minister 
pointing that this radical change was being introduced into the Act?” 
 
It would appear that the present state of the law, (with particular attention to what appear to be policy 
formulations), casts doubt on the validity of a trade mark registration for a shape which is a 
functional part of the inherent form of goods. 
 
Of course, I have considered these issues in a vacuum reviewing only the competing products and the 
law. If there is a body of consumer evidence that the offending products by their shape are 
marketed to indicate the origin of the product, it may make a difference, but ultimately the 
concern that a perpetual monopoly is created appears to be a telling consideration. 
 
Question 
The Issues Paper notes: 
“Clearly, the Legislature intended that the new kinds of marks should be registrable as 
trade marks.”  
Did the Government intend that there should be a “break” by reference to functionality? 
Is it something the Government should clarify, as such owners may understandably 
assume that they have an enforceable right? 
 
Dimitri Eliades  
29 April 2002 
 
